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CHIMERA OR JACKALOPE?  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EFFORTS TO
APPLY CIVILIAN SEXUAL HARASSMENT CRITERIA TO THE MILITARY
MICHAEL F. NOONE*
“If one guy looks at you but you like him, it’s flirting.  If he gives you the
‘creeps,’ it’s sexual harassment.”1
“A pass is different from harassment.”2
I. INTRODUCTION
Criteria developed to proscribe sexually harassing behavior, as defined by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,3 are being used in the armed forces to
which the Act does not apply.4  This application of the Act is pernicious and
helps neither the cause of military women nor the legitimate goals of the armed
forces.  This usage of Title VII, like any challenge to the present regulatory re-
gime, could be viewed as a threat to military women’s status.  Consider, how-
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L.L.M. from Georgetown University Law Center, and an S.J.D from The George Washington Uni-
versity Law School.
This essay is dedicated to the late Lizann M. Longstreet, Captain, USN Res., staff attorney
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.  She may not have agreed, but would have
enjoyed the discussion.  Thanks to Clare Dowling of Rep. Carolyn Maloney’s office and Andrea
Stone of USA Today who first raised the topic with me.  Thanks also to Women in International Se-
curity at the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland for their December 1997 program on
Sexual Harassment and Gender Discrimination in the Military, to the Independent Women’s Forum
for their 1998 panel discussions on Sexual Harassment, and to Lisa Daniel, Army Times Corp.,
Colonel Barbara Mahoney Lee, USA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs), the National Women’s Law Center, Yvette Brown, research librarian, Catholic
University Law School, and Bernadette Lamson, former Assistant County Attorney of Montgomery
County, Maryland for information supplied.  None of those thanked have read this paper or were
aware of its theme.
1. 1 SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, SENIOR REVIEW PANEL REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT, 81-82
(July 1997) (citing the response of a female trainee) [hereinafter 1 SENIOR REVIEW REPORT].
2. Sandra McElwaine, A Different Kind of War, USA WEEKEND, Oct. 3-5, 1997, at 5 (quoting Lt.
Gen. Claudia Kennedy, USA).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; see also Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1458 (11th Cir. 1990); Kawitt v.
United States, 842 F.2d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 1988).
4. Section 717(a) of Title VII extends the Act’s protection to federal employees including those
in the military departments.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1994); see also Roper v. Department of the
Army, 832 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1987); Stinson v. Hornsby, 821 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1987); Salazar v.
Heckler, 787 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1986); Gonzalez v. Department of the Army, 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir.
1983); Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir. 1978) (excluding uniformed military per-
sonnel from the Act’s coverage by a military exception).  Cf. Carlson v. United States Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs., 879 F. Supp. 545, 547 (D. Md. 1995) (discussing whether uniformed
members of the Public Health Service are subject to the “military exception”).
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ever, a widely accepted social fact about late Twentieth Century United States
society that was articulated by philosopher Richard Rorty in “A Cultural Left”:
[T]he casual infliction of humiliation is much less socially acceptable than it was
during the first two-thirds of the century.  The tone in which educated men talk
about women, and educated whites about blacks, is very different from what it
was before the Sixties.  Life for homosexual Americans, beleaguered and dan-
gerous as it still is, is better than it was before Stonewall.  The adoption of atti-
tudes which the Right sneers at as “politically correct” has made America a far
more civilized society than it was thirty years ago.5
If civility - politeness or courtesy based on mutual respect - is a legitimate
social goal, then Rorty’s broad statement should be a matter for celebration.  Yet,
what Rorty does not say is equally important.  First, Rorty speaks to behavior
which is no longer socially acceptable, but he does not advocate criminalizing
that behavior.  Second, he speaks about “the educated,” - dare I say the elite? -
not the hoi polloi.  Finally, Rorty discusses American society as a whole, and not
the smaller peculiar community, the armed forces, which is the focus of this arti-
cle. The Supreme Court, for more than a century, has acknowledged that while
the soldier is also a citizen,6 the military, as a “specialized community governed
by a separate discipline”7 may regulate or permit service members’ conduct in
ways which would be constitutionally impermissible in civilian society.8  This
premise underlies any judicial interpretation of service member’s rights and du-
5. RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY 81 (1998) (Stonewall is widely considered the
first unifying event for the homosexual community in the pursuit of equal rights).
6. See JOHN M. LINDLEY, A SOLDIER IS ALSO A CITIZEN, THE CONTROVERSY OVER MILITARY
JUSTICE, 1917-1920 (1990); Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181
(1962).
7. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94
(1953)).
8. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding military refusal to permit a
Jewish officer from wearing his yarmulke while in uniform).  For a measured criticism of civilian
judicial deference to military decision making, see Jonathan Lurie, The Role of the Federal Judiciary in
the Governance of the American Military: The United States Supreme Court and ‘Civil Rights and Supervi-
sion’ Over the Armed Forces, in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 405, 405-30 (Richard H. Kohn ed., 1991).  Lurie mistakenly describes the wearer of
the yarmulke as a chaplain. See id. at 425.  Critics who complain of the present military mindset
against women - what one author has described as “androcentrism,” see Kathryn Abrams, Gender in
The Military, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 222 (Autumn 1993), acknowledge that the doctrine of
judicial deference effectively bars judicial review of what would otherwise be challenged as dis-
criminatory practices.  See LINDA BIRD FRANCKE, GROUND ZERO: THE GENDER WARS IN THE MILITARY
279 n.70 (1997); see also JUDITH HICKS STIEHEM, ARMS AND THE ENLISTED WOMAN 109 (1989).  Because
the concept of a separate community has social science implications, it also has consequences for
legal analysis.  Thus, when a Duke University law professor recently compared statistics concerning
the sexual behavior of members of the armed forces, see Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape,
War and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651 (1996), to civilian statistics, she did not refer to a study of
national sexual practices which, two years earlier, concluded that “[t]he largest group of individuals
who are likely to be sexually active are in college, the military, or prison.  Because each of these in-
stitutions has a substantial influence on the attitudes and experiences of their members, it would be
wise to design and execute specialized research projects to study these groups separately.” EDWARD
O. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED
STATES 553 (1994).
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ties.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the fundamental law lays the
foundation for civil, not criminal, liability for sexually harassing discriminatory
behavior in commercial, rather than social, situations.9  This article addresses as-
pects of Title VII case law that focuses on sexual harassment in the workplace
and not on other forms of gender based discrimination.  In the workplace con-
text, the statute has been interpreted to apply to two different situations: the
quid pro quo proposal where sexual favors are sought in return for favorable
treatment, and the “hostile work environment” where the recipient of sexually
charged behavior claims that it has unreasonably altered her working condi-
tions.10  The most important characteristics of quid pro quo claims are that 1)
they may be asserted even though the plaintiff originally consented to the pro-
posal,11 and 2) they impose strict liability on the employer of the harasser.12  Al-
ternatively, hostile work environment claims require some degree of employer
knowledge, actual or constructive, before liability can be imposed.13  These claims
may be categorized as involving either 1) touching14 or 2) “climatic” situations in
which, over time, the recipient is confronted with unwelcome sexually oriented
behavior.15  Also, in contrast to quid pro quo claims, the hostile work environ-
ment plaintiff may be a bystander.16  For example, a female employee at an office
work station who is exposed to sexual, scatological conversations by persons on
9. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of an individual’s race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); see also SEX DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT IN THE WORK PLACE (Lawrence Solotoff & Henry S. Kramer eds., 1998) [hereinafter Solotoff
& Kramer].
10. The distinction, first made in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), was recently
reaffirmed in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).  Same sex discriminatory behav-
ior, the subject of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998), could fall within
Department of Defense prohibitions.  In the interest of space and prose style, I will assume that the
target of behavior is female and that the actor is a male.
11. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a); see generally SUSAN M. OMILIAN & JEAN P. KAMP, SEX-BASED
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 22:13 (1998) [hereinafter OMILIAN & KAMP].
12. See Solotoff & Kramer, supra note 9, § 3.02[2].
13. See OMILIAN & KAMP, supra note 11, § 23:02.  As to the Supreme Court’s recent creation of
an employer’s affirmative defense of reasonable care,  see Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93, and Burling-
ton Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998).
14. An example of touching is assault and battery, in which one unconsented act may be suffi-
cient to trigger employer liability.  See Tommka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995).
15. “[In hostile environment cases], a showing of pervasiveness lessens the required showing of
severity; conversely, a showing of severity lessens the required showing of pervasiveness.”  Solotoff
& Kramer, supra note 9, § 3.04[2] (citing Trotta v. Mobil Oil Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1336 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)).
16. The term “bystander” is used in tort actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress to
describe the witness whose actionable claim results from watching harm inflicted on another.  For
example, consider a mother’s claim against a driver who runs over her child.  See John L. Diamond,
Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible
Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (1984); cf. Marcie Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-
C.L.L. REV. 1, 46-49 (1990) (discussing the tendency for female employees to become quasi-captive
audience members of sexualized speech).
NOONEMACRO4 05/18/99  2:22 PM
154 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 6:151 1999
the other side of a partition who are unaware of her presence could bring a hos-
tile work environment claim.  Yet, this employee’s claim is limited by Title VII
which recognizes that not all speech is actionable.  Demeaning and discrimina-
tory words or actions, unrelated to the work place, may be, and are, condemned
as boorish or discourteous, but may fall outside the statute’s reach.17  For exam-
ple, if getting “hit on” by another customer while shopping was defined as sex-
ual harassment, then the term has no legal meaning.
II. THE SPECIALIZED COMMUNITY
Under the judge made military exception,18 if a military woman19 is the
subject of workplace20 harassment she is not able to assert the rights granted by
Title VII.  Instead, this situation is covered by a Department of Defense (DoD)
Directive.21  Before considering the DoD Directive governing sexual harassment,
however, one should consider the civil remedies available to non-military
women.  If the harasser’s behavior constituted a tort, the civilian plaintiff typi-
cally would seek to hold the harasser’s employer vicariously liable for harassing
acts committed within the scope of employment.22  Alternatively, a military
woman seeking to hold her employer, the United States, vicariously liable would
assert her claim under the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act.23  Her claim
would fail, however, simply because she is a member of military.  As a member
of the military, her claim would be barred by the so-called Feres doctrine which
precludes tort claims by military personnel injured “incident to service” by a
federal tortfeasor.24  The possibility that such suits could “call into question
military discipline and decision making, [which] would itself require judicial in-
quiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters”25 serves as justification
for the doctrine.  The distinction is vividly illustrated by the case of Kelly Ther-
iot, a civilian lawyer at Madigan Army Medical Center at Fort Lewis Washing-
17. As indicated in the EEOC guidelines, not all discriminatory speech or conduct in the work-
place violates Title VII; rather only behavior that unreasonably interferes with work performance or
creates a hostile or offensive working environment is sexually harassing.  See EEOC: Policy Guid-
ance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 6681 (Mar. 19, 1990). 
18. See supra text accompanying note 4.
19. As the Department of Defense is composed of both military and civilian personnel, harass-
ment may occur across these lines.  Civilian men and women employed in, or by, the Department of
Defense may be subject to sexual harassment.  The claims of civilians would be adjudicated under
procedures generally applicable to federal (executive branch) employees.  See Solotoff & Kramer,
supra note 9, §§ 1.12, 12.  Civilian claims, even those resulting from the acts of military personnel,
are not the subject of this paper.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 42-50  (defining “workplace”).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
22. See OMILIAN & KAMP, supra note 11, § 11.06. (explaining the doctrine of respondeat superior).
23. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671-80 (1994).
24. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); see also JOHN M. STEADMAN ET AL., LITI-
GATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT § 13.105.1 (1994).
25. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682 (1987). The same doctrine has been held by the
Supreme Court to bar both common law and constitutional claims against the tortfeasor.  See Chap-
pell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
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ton.26  She accused a colonel (since promoted to general) of sexual harassment.27
The Army settled her claim for $500,000.28  Had she been a military lawyer, the
Feres doctrine would have precluded her compensable claim.  In place of legal
remedies, what does the Department of Defense offer?
The Department of Defense Directive29 that addresses sexual harassment is
“Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program.”  The
MEO program is intended to carry out a policy that “[u]nlawful discrimination
against persons or groups based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin is
contrary to good order and discipline and is counterproductive to combat readi-
ness and mission accomplishment.”30  It defines sexual harassment as:
A form of sex discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, re-
quests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
when:
a.  Submission to such conduct is made explicitly or implicitly a term or condi-
tion of a person’s job, pay, or career, or
b.  Submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for
career or employment decisions affecting that person, or
c.  Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.31
The DoD language is identical to the 1980 Guidelines issued32 by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) when it declared sexual harass-
ment a violation of Section 703 of Title VII.  Several aspects of the Department of
Defense replication of the regulation are noteworthy since the original EEOC
regulation was intended to define the circumstances under which employer civil
liability could be imposed.33
The portion of the EEOC regulation relating to submission or rejection as a
basis for employment decisions has very limited application to the military
services.  An example of a violation of the EEOC regulation in the civilian con-
text would be if an employer told a job applicant that consenting to sexual rela-
tions (or other form of unwanted sexual behavior) was a prerequisite to obtain-
ing and holding a position.  The military analogue to this example would be a
26. See General, Woman Settle Sex-Harassment Case, THE WASH. TIMES, June 20, 1998, at A3.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 1350.2, THE DEFENSE MILITARY EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
PROGRAM (last modified May 7, 1997) <http://web7.whs.osd.mil/pdf/d13502p.pdf> [hereinafter
DoD Directive].
30. Id. ¶ 4.2  In the interest of brevity, I will not summarize the organizational structures cre-
ated by the Directive, its predecessors, and its implementation by each of the military services.
31. Id. ¶ E2.1.15.
32. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980).
33. See Solotoff & Kramer supra note 9, § 3.01[1].
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similar offer extended by a recruiter.  The civilian definition assumes that the
harasser, unlike a military recruiter, has the authority to hire and retain an em-
ployee.  As military recruiters do not have this authority, it is not surprising that
research revealed no cases where a prospective enlistee complained that sexual
cooperation was demanded as a condition for enrollment.34  Thus, it is inappro-
priate to apply civilian provisions relating to hiring decisions by analogy to
military recruitment.
The EEOC provision regarding submission as a term or condition of job,
pay, or career has slight application to the military where formal job descriptions
and career paths are defined by military bureaucracy and pay rates are set by
Congress.  In this context, harassing behavior in the military occurs when sub-
mission to, or rejection of, such conduct is used as a basis for career decisions.
The Aberdeen, Maryland35 and Great Lakes, Illinois36 cases best exemplify this
problem.  In these cases, recruits reported that they were induced to have sex
with their trainers in order to get good assignments or to ensure successful com-
pletion of a course.37  It is noteworthy that, even in this context, there is a major
distinction between the civilian employee who can rely on the concept of
“constructive discharge,” and claim compensation as the recipient of quid pro
quo harassment,38 and a uniformed member of the armed forces who cannot le-
gally withdraw unilaterally from her military occupation.  If she did so, she
would be charged with the military crimes of Desertion or Absence Without
Leave.39  As a result, the doctrine of constructive discharge cannot be applied in
the military context.
Finally, in the military context, the most problematic portion of the EEOC
definition relates to sexually harassing conduct which has the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creates an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.  This paper will explore
whether the EEOC formulae, which were intended to set the parameters defin-
ing a hostile workplace environment, will be useful in the military.
34. The closest incident, which could loosely be considered an analogue, occurred when an Air
Force captain was convicted, dismissed and jailed for having sex with one of his ROTC cadets at the
University of Texas and for having twice kissed another cadet on the mouth and threatening to pre-
vent her graduation from training.  See Julie Bird, Ex-ROTC Instructor is Convicted, AIR FORCE TIMES,
May 5, 1997, at 2.
35. See Tom Bowman and Lisa Respers, Many Aberdeen Issues Unresolved a Year Later, BAL-
TIMORE SUN, Nov. 8, 1997, at 1A.
36. See Amanda Vogt, Navy Instructor’s Court Martial Begins: Sex Misconduct Case 3d For Great
Lakes, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 15, 1998, at 1; David Southwell, Didn’t Want Sex With Supervisor, CHICAGO
SUN TIMES, June 4, 1998, at 18.
37. See supra notes 35-36; see also 10 U.S.C. § 885, 886 (1994).
38. Solotoff & Kramer, supra note 9, § 3.04[1].
39. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES IV, ¶ 9, 10 (1998) [hereinafter MCM].
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III. SETTING STANDARDS FOR CIVILITY40 IN THE SPECIALIZED COMMUNITY
The DoD Directive explains that:
This definition [of sexual harassment] emphasizes that workplace conduct, to be
actionable as “abusive work environment” harassment, need not result in con-
crete psychological harm to the victim, but rather need only be so severe and
pervasive that a reasonable person would perceive, and the victim does per-
ceive, the work environment as hostile or offensive.41
The Directive’s language is drawn directly from the 1993 Supreme Court
decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,42 and, as such, is an accurate statement
of the law.  Whether it is helpful to an analysis of sexual harassment in the mili-
tary is another matter.  Harris was intended to guide courts in their charge to a
jury called on to assess civil liability, but the Directive has a different purpose.43
Its purposes, besides reissuing a prior Directive on the same topic, are to regu-
late the Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity Program, provide
for education and training in Equal Opportunity, provide standard terms for the
program and to establish Department-wide standards for discrimination com-
plaint processing and resolution.44  The Directive’s explanation of harassment is
directed not at a randomly selected jury, in conjunction with a “preponderance
of the evidence” burden of proof and persuasion instructions, but, inter alia, to
the Service Secretaries, to the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and to the
commanders of the combatant commands45 and other individuals neither ran-
domly selected nor disinterested in the consequences, as a jury would be.46
40. The term “civility” might suggest that I consider hostile environment claims to be trivial.
That is not the case.  Civility, as defined in the text accompanying note 5 supra, is a fundamental
component of unit cohesion which social scientists consider to be the sine qua non of combat effec-
tiveness.  See Stanford Gregory, Toward a Situated Description of Cohesion and Disintegration in the
American Army, 3 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 463 (1977); COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: COHESION, STRESS,
AND THE VOLUNTEER MILITARY, (Sam C. Sarkesian ed., 1980).  One of the recurring themes in the
Army’s 1997 Senior Panel Report was the effect of sexual harassment on unit cohesion.  See supra
note 1; 2 SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, SENIOR REVIEW PANEL REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT 80 (July
1997) [hereinafter 2 SENIOR REVIEW REPORT]; see also Leora N. Rosen and Lee Martin, Sexual Harass-
ment, Cohesion, and Combat Readiness in U.S. Army Support Units, 24 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 221
(1997) [hereinafter Rosen & Martin].
41. DoD Directive, supra note 29, ¶ E2.1.15.3.
42. 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (stating that “the alleged conduct need not cause injury or seriously
affect” a plaintiff’s “psychological well-being” to qualify as an actionable “abusive work environ-
ment”).
43. See id. at 21-23 (discussing the standard to be applied in a Title VII case); Solotoff & Kramer,
supra note 6, § 3.05[2]; see also Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment as a Tort, Why Title VII Environ-
ment Liability Should be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV. 375-439 (1998) (criticizing the standard).
44. DoD Directive, supra note 29, ¶ 1.1-1.6.
45. Id. ¶ 2.
46. The definitions are used in any military EO investigation.  For admittedly subjective as-
sessments of the Army’s investigation of the sexual harassment claims against Sgt. Maj. Eugene
McKinney, see Charles Gittins, Show Trial, NAT’L REV., May 4, 1998, at 28; Glen Skoler, The Half-Told
Story of Sgt. Maj. McKinney, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at C7.  For an opposing view, see Andrea
Stone, Military’s Gender Battle Still far from Resolved, USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 1998, at 4A (quoting Rep.
Carolyn Maloney, (D)N.Y., commenting on women’s roles in the military).
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Thus, “harassment,” a term intended to define the characteristics of behavior
which would be “actionable,” (i.e. impose liability on employers), is used by the
Department of Defense to define behavior which, if directed against a member
of the armed forces, could not result in a finding of liability.
An additional peculiarity in the Directive is that “‘[w]orkplace’ [is defined]
as an expansive term for Military members to include conduct on or off duty, 24
hours a day.”47  This definition, while “expansive,” must be subject to some
limitations, otherwise any offensive behavior could constitute harassment.  The
“incident to service” or “service connection” criteria, which have been used in
other areas of military justice, could be useful for establishing “workplace” and
limiting the breadth of the definition.  In the context of tort injuries, federal
courts have, for nearly half a century, held that injuries sustained “incident to
service” are barred by the Feres doctrine.48  Correspondingly, under military jus-
tice, only those offenses committed with a “service connection” may be subject
to trial by court martial.49  Thus, when the military investigates a claim of sexual
harassment, these criteria - tort (“incident to service”) or military justice
(“service connected”) - may prove useful for defining “workplace.”50
Another problem with the Directive is that it does not include an analysis
for two well-developed standards under civilian law: 1) the totality of the cir-
cumstances51 and 2) whether the employer knew or should have known of the
behavior.52  These terms and concepts, which are central to Title VII claims,  are
absent from the Directive.  In many cases, however, the Department’s efforts to
apply, Title VII reasoning to instances of abusive behavior in the military would
be appropriate if these standards were adopted.
Two recent cases, involving similar abusive behavior, illustrate the current
differences between civilian and military legal regimes.  In the civilian context,
Capt. Tammy S. Blakey, a pilot for Continental Airlines sued her employer un-
der Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.53  She claimed that
47. DoD Directive, supra note 29, ¶ E2.1.15.3.
48. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).  See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.  Over
the past half-century, courts have tried unsuccessfully to articulate the precise criteria necessary to
establish when an injury is sustained incident to service.
49. Military courts have tried without success to define the conditions when an offense is
“service connected” and therefore subject to trial by court martial.  See Solorio v. United States, 483
U.S. 435, 435 (1987) (finding that the jurisdiction of a court martial dependent solely on accused’s
status as a member of the Armed Services is not a “service connection”); O’Callahan v. Parker, 395
U.S. 258, 272-73 (1969) (holding that a military tribunal may not try a service man charged with a
crime that has no “service connection”).
50. There is no clear answer as to which criteria would be used.  As such, Army Staff Judge
Advocates [SJAs] reported that “some commanders seem to lack understanding of what constitutes
a hostile work environment,” 2 SENIOR REVIEW REPORT, supra note 40, at 97, while “[s]ome SJA sug-
gest a separate article [in the UCMJ] for charging sexual harassment and or sexual misconduct.
They also suggest clarification of the concepts of fraternization and hostile work environment.”  Id.
at 98.
51. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1998).
52. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d), (e).
53. See Jerry DeMarco, Pilot Wins $1M in Cockpit Smut Suit, THE RECORD, Oct. 17, 1997, at A1.
The trial judge subsequently reduced the emotional distress award to $250,000.  See Lydia Barbara
Bashwiner, Emotional-Distress Damages Subject to Remittitur if Verdict is Unsupported by the Evidence,
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Continental failed to stop the practice of flight crews leaving behind porno-
graphic pictures for incoming crews.54  These pictures were glued to the bottom
of cockpit drawers, in flight manuals, and behind panels marked with an X.55  A
jury awarded her $500,000 for emotional distress and $350,000 for lost salary.56
This case illustrates that employers are not shielded from liability when a female
employee is exposed to sex-related behavior which was traditionally part of the
male working environment.57
Meanwhile, First Lieutenant Julie Clemm, newly assigned to the 90th
Fighter Squadron, deployed to Aviano Air Base Italy to patrol the no-fly zone in
Bosnia, described similar harassing behavior.58  Lt. Clemm complained to the Air
Force Inspector General about male Squadron members who were permitted to
display a naked female blowup doll at the Squadron Thanksgiving party, to
leave sexually explicit magazines in the Alert Facility and the Alert vehicle, and
to show sexually explicit films in the Operations Building.59  Clemm’s claim of
sexual harassment merely resulted in her supervisor being charged with making
an inappropriate joke.60
As the harassing behaviors in both cases are similar, there should not be a
distinction between the treatment of the harassers merely because the settings
differed: a benign domestic airline versus a hostile fire zone.  One explanation
for the differing outcomes in these cases is that the DoD Directive lacks “the to-
tality of the circumstances” test.  DoD’s wholesale adoption of EEOC criteria
without its nuances offers no guidance and creates particular problems in the
area of criminal law.
IV. CRIMINALIZING INCIVILITY IN THE SPECIALIZED COMMUNITY
Notably, Title VII does not impose criminal penalties. The employer who,
passively or actively, harasses an employee is subject to civil liability and, since
1991, to punitive damages.61 However, the same DoD Directive which relies so
heavily on civilian criteria defining sexual harassment provides that “unlawful
N.J. LAW., Feb. 16, 1998, at 32.  The trial judge also awarded $764,000 in attorney’s fees and $211,000
in costs.  See Circuit: $3M to Quadriplegic Not ‘Shockingly Inadequate’, N.J. L.J., Apr. 20, 1998, at 7.
Had Captain Blakey been a pilot in the Air Force her claim would have been dismissed.  See supra
text accompanying notes 24-25.
54. See Jerry DeMarco, Pilot Wins $1M in Cockpit Smut Suit, THE RECORD, Oct. 17, 1997, at A1.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997) (discussing the tradition of
sexual hazing in the workplace); Saum v. Widnall, 959 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1997) (applying the
standard to the experience of an Air Force Academy cadet undergoing Survival Training).
58. See Julie Bird, A Brief Look at the Complaints, AIR FORCE TIMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at 8.
59. See id.
60. See Parents See an Air Force Cover-Up, AIR FORCE TIMES, Oct. 6, 1997, at 13.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (b)(1) (1994).  Punitive damages are capped according to the
number of employees.  See id. § 1981a(b)(3).  Presumably Congress, the EEOC, and the courts ex-
pected that employers will, having paid the penalty, cure the environment.  That is not always the
case.  See Julia Duin, Pueschel Seeks $2 Million Settlement, WASH. TIMES, June 16, 1998, at A2
(reporting that a Federal Aviation Administration female employee found to have been harassed
then returned to the same worksite and same harassing employees).
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discrimination . . . is contrary to good order and discipline. . . .”62  Conduct con-
trary to good order and discipline is an offense under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), and thus, criminal.
Department of Defense Directives are not self-executing; they are directed
to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure compliance.63  Each Sec-
retary is then expected to issue Departmental regulations to enforce the Direc-
tive.64  As an example, consider the Department of the Army65 policy regarding
Equal Opportunity which is found in Chapter 6, Army Regulation 600-20, Army
Command Policy.66  A recent Army publication discusses the regulation’s legal
consequences:
Although Chapter 6 of AR 600-20 is not punitive, the commander’s inherent
authority to impose administrative sanctions and the nonjudicial punishment
and punitive articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provide
commanders with sufficient authority to enforce Army policy in matters of dis-
crimination and harassment.67
Administrative sanctions range from counseling to censure and adminis-
trative withholding of privileges and need not be based on behavior which con-
stitutes a crime under the UCMJ.68  Punitive actions for harassment can range
from non-judicial punishment to court-martial.69
Moreover, there are five peculiarities of military jurisprudence which in-
crease the likelihood of sanction or punishment when a commander learns of an
incident of sexual harassment.  These peculiarities extend the range of a com-
mander’s options beyond those available to either a district attorney or an em-
ployer.  First, commanders may impose administrative sanctions for acts which
do not constitute a crime under the UCMJ or for acts which could not be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.70  This contrasts to a federal prosecutor who must be
satisfied that a crime has been committed and can be proven.71  Second, the
UCMJ lists offenses which have no civilian counterpart and which, when ap-
62. See DoD Directive, supra note 29, ¶ 4.2.
63. See id. ¶ 6.2 (requiring the Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure compliance).
Each Secretary is expected to then issue Departmental regulations to enforce the Directive.
64. See DoD Directive, supra note 29, ¶ 6.2.5 (establishing and publishing complaint proce-
dures).  See SENIOR REVIEW REPORT, supra notes 1 and 40.  (My citations are all drawn from the Army
simply because this report conveniently summarized that Service’s sexual harassment policies im-
plementing the DoD Directive.)
65. See 1 SENIOR REVIEW REPORT, supra note 1.
66. See id. at E5-E6.
67. Id. at E7.
68. See MCM V, ¶ 1.g; see, e.g., James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing the
Army’s refusal to extend a soldier’s enlistment for five months, thus disqualifying him for retire-
ment pay when he failed a drug test and received non-judicial punishment).
69. See MCM V, ¶ 1.g (describing the range of corrective measures available in non-judicial
punishment proceedings).
70. See id.
71. Cf. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18-19 (1940)
(stating that a prosecutor is required to select those cases for prosecution “in which the offense is the
most flagrant, the public harm the greatest, and the proof the most certain”).
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plied to incidents of sexual harassment, offer the military the option to punish
acts which would not constitute a crime in civilian life.72  Third, Article 15 of the
UCMJ permits punishment without trial.73 There is no civilian equivalent of such
non-judicial punishment.  Fourth, the defense of consent, which is widely avail-
able in the civilian context, has been eliminated when the accused is superior in
rank to the sexual partner.74  Fifth, unlike civilian employers, a military com-
mander’s authority to respond to harassment complaints is neither limited by
labor/management agreements75 nor constrained by First Amendment implica-
tions.76
As discussed previously,77 none of the remedies available to the civilian re-
cipient of unwanted sexual attention are available to military females. The puni-
tive tools available to commanders suggests a similar legal asymmetry in the
case of military harassers: they are more easily punished than their civilian
counterparts.  But how common are these offenses?  The next section discusses
how military surveys of the incidence of sexual harassment, ostensibly relying
on civilian measurement techniques, do not provide data which would satisfy
Title VII and EEOC criteria.
V. MILITARY RESEARCH ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Three surveys illustrate the difficulties of using civilian standards to meas-
ure military behavior.  Although similar, they merit separate analysis, even
though, none of them were designed to determine compliance with the DoD Di-
rective on discrimination.  The first, “1988 DoD Survey of Sex Roles in the Ac-
tive-Duty Military,”78 instructed respondents that “[c]ertain kinds of
72. For example, quid pro quo harassment might be charged under MCM IV, ¶ 8 (Article 84 -
Unlawful enlistment), while quid pro quo or hostile environment harassment might be charged un-
der MCM IV, ¶ 12 (Articles 88 - Contempt toward officials), MCM IV, ¶ 13.c.(2) (Article 89  - Disre-
spect toward a superior officer), MCM IV, ¶ 15.b(3) (Article 91 - Insubordinate conduct), MCM IV, ¶
16 (Article 92 - Failure to obey), MCM IV, ¶ 17 (Article 93 - Cruelty and maltreatment), MCM IV, ¶
59.c.(2) (Article 133 - Conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman) or MCM IV, ¶ 60.a (Article 134
- General article).  Criminal responsibility for creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working
environment might be charged under MCM IV, ¶ 16 (Article 92 - Failure to obey) or MCM IV, ¶
60.b.(2) (Article 134 - Disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline).
73. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1998).  Under most circumstances, an accused may demand trial but will
risk a conviction.
74. The military doctrine of constructive force, articulated in United States v. Webster, 40 M.J.
384 (C.M.A. 1994), has been described as an “approach [which] is progressive, yet at the same time
successfully avoids the suspect legal reasoning, impracticable statutory redefinitions, and radical
sociological assumptions which affect the law of rape in the civilian sector.  It accomplishes what
other jurisdictions have, for the most part, failed to accomplish: a principled approach to criminal-
izing all sexual intercourse which is coercive and unwanted.”  See Maj. Timothy W. Murphy
U.S.A.F., A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 A.F. L. REV. 19, 34 (1996).
75. See Solotoff & Kramer, supra note 9, § 1.16 (describing the effects of collective bargaining
agreements for sexual discrimination claims in the civilian workplace).
76. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (stating the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that in cases raising First Amendment issues “an appellate Court has an obligation
to make an independent examination of the whole record.”).
77. See supra  text accompanying notes 19-25.
78. See Juanita Firestone & Richard J. Harris, Sexual Harassment in the U.S. Military: Individual-
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UNINVITED and UNWANTED sexual talk and behavior at work can be consid-
ered sexual harassment.”79  The survey, however, did not define the term “at
work.”80  The survey asked about UNINVITED and UNWANTED sexual atten-
tion DURING THE LAST TWELVE MONTHS where you work in the active
duty military.81  Unlike the civilian model, where the typical job is separated
from home,82 military installations are the last “company towns,” where every-
one in the community has the same employer.  It is not clear whether military
respondents were expected to list any incident which took place on post.  In fact
the survey report uses the terms “work,” “work site,” and “workplace” inter-
changeably, leaving open the hypothetical question of whether sexual talk or
attention of a non-coworker, at the post bowling alley on a Saturday night would
qualify.83  Also, the typical military respondent, unlike a civilian, may be report-
ing on experiences during the prior twelve months at a number of geographic
locations (e.g. first at technical school, then at a permanent assignment, then an
overseas base, then a U.S. posting, etc.).  Thus, the “workplace environment”
surveyed for the Department of Defense was anywhere members of the armed
forces were assigned, unlike the typical compliance survey undertaken for
EEOC purposes, where the worksite and workforce are stable.84  These differ-
ences between military and civilian milieus make it difficult to compare work-
place harassing behaviors using Title VII criteria.
In fact, the surveys compounded the problem by using Title VII and DoD
sexual harassment terms, but defining them differently.  The EEOC criteria for
determining a “hostile environment,” utilize a two pronged model involving se-
verity and pervasiveness85 while the survey simply asked respondents “whether
they had experienced any ‘sexual talk or behavior at work during the past year
that, overall, created an offensive, hostile or intimidating environment’ for
them.”86  One can imagine a single offensive statement which, from the respon-
dent’s point of view, poisoned the working environment, but was not severe or
pervasive enough to constitute sexual harassment.87  Similarly, by focusing solely
ized and Environmental Concerns, 21 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 25 (1994) [hereinafter Firestone & Har-
ris].
79. Id. at 31 (emphasis in original).
80. Supra note 47 (noting the expansive definition given to the term workplace under the DoD
Directive).
81. See Firestone & Harris, supra note 78, at 34 (emphasis in original).
82. But see Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 17 (1998) (addressing the different contextual issues which sexual harassment at home raises
and how the current application of established legal principles in this area is fatally flawed).
83. Firestone & Harris, supra note 78.
84. In the most recent survey used in this article, Army respondents were asked to differentiate
between occurrences in barracks, on post, on the job, or off post.  See 2 SENIOR REVIEW REPORT, supra
note 40, at 34.  The most frequently reported location was “elsewhere on post.” Id. at 47.  Respon-
dents were also asked to distinguish between occurrences at their present job, their previous job, or
during training.  See id.
85. DoD Directive, supra note 29, ¶ E2.1.15.3; see also Solotoff & Kramer, supra note 9, § 3.04[2].
86. Firestone & Harris, supra note 78, at 32 (emphasis added).
87. See, e.g., Zweiter v. Brazilian Nat’l Superintendency of Merchant Marine, 833 F. Supp. 1089
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (asserting that sexually offensive behavior is not actionable per se).
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on the respondents’ perception of “UNINVITED and UNWANTED sexual at-
tention,” the survey ignores both 1) the traditional two pronged legal test which
requires that conduct be both subjectively and objectively offensive and 2) the
“totality of the circumstances” test.88  Finally, the survey blurs the distinction
between bystanders and objects of unwanted sexual attention.89  While the sur-
vey may accurately represent the incidence of perceptions of inappropriate sex-
ual behavior, it is not useful for discovering the extent of the military’s compli-
ance with Title VII and EEOC guidelines.90
The second military sponsored study examined soldiers’91 perceptions of
sexual harassment in their unit and the consequences for unit cohesion.92  Cohe-
sion in a military context is both vertical (relationship between subordinate and
superior) and horizontal (relationship between peers).93  The researchers re-
ported that
Using aggregate data from thirty-four army companies, we found that two
measures of sexual harassment correlated negatively with vertical cohesion,
combat readiness, and acceptance of women.  The strongest group level corre-
lation was that between gender harassment and vertical cohesion (. . .) thus
providing empirical support for the contention that poor leadership is impli-
cated in a hostile work environment and may be partly responsible for creating
and maintaining such an environment.  The study has also shown, through
group level correlations, that a hostile work environment is associated with
lower combat readiness.  Where sexual harassment was high, preparedness for
88. 2 SENIOR REVIEW REPORT, supra note 40, at 38 (discussing survey results regarding un-
wanted sexual attention).
89. See Firestone & Harris, supra note 78, at 35.
We have also subdivided the behaviors into those that represent ‘individualized’ harass-
ment, focusing on personal sexual issues (rape/assault, sexual favors, touching, . . . let-
ters/phone calls, [invitations to engage in] dates, sexual activities), and those that might
be considered ‘environmental’ harassment (looks/gestures, teasing/jokes, whistles/calls).
The latter tend to be less focused on a particular individual, but reflect and define a sexual
context for the workplace.
90. The authors found that the survey was a useful tool with which to measure the military’s
compliance with Title VII and the EEOC guidelines stated that:
“these results suggest that in spite of criticisms which imply that the redefinition of sexual
harassment to include ‘creating a hostile work environment’ is too broad and idiosyn-
cratic, a large proportion of men and women apparently both understand the definition
and recognize such behaviors.”
Firestone & Harris, supra note 78, at 32.  However, the definition the respondents were given did not
match, in several ways, the definition the law relies on.
91. For convenience, I have used three surveys: two undertaken by the Walter Reed Army In-
stitute of Research, supra note 1, and the DoD survey, supra note 1, previously discussed, see supra
text accompanying notes 64-69.  All seem to rely on similar methodologies as do those listed in
Sorenson et al., Solving the Chronic Problem of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An Empirical Study
of Factors Affecting Employee Perceptions and Consequences of Sexual Harassment, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 457
(1998).  For a comparison of several of the surveys’ findings see 2 SENIOR REVIEW REPORT, supra note
40, at 20.
92. See Rosen & Martin, supra note 40, at 222.
93. See COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: COHESION, STRESS, AND THE VOLUNTEER MILITARY, (Sam C.
Sarkesian ed., 1980).
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the mission was low.94
There is no obvious reason to question these conclusions.  Yet, after ana-
lyzing the prior DoD survey, an inquiry into how the researchers used the terms
“sexual harassment” and “hostile work environment” is demanded.  Were the
terms used as defined in the DoD Directive95 and, by extension, in Title
VII/EEOC jurisprudence?  The terms were used as follows:
For social scientists, it makes sense to approach environmental harassment as a
work climate variable similar to cohesion or leadership climate, and to base it
on measures that meet acceptable psychometric standards.  The Sexual Experi-
ences Questionnaire (SEQ) developed by Fitzgerald and colleagues may provide
such a measure.  The SEQ was derived from items identified through content
analysis of a national survey of college women.  The basis of the questions is
their focus on the experience of certain behaviors as distinct from subjective
perceptions of whether or not these constitute harassment.  Items elicit informa-
tion about experiences in the workplace ranging from offensive remarks to at-
tempted rape.96
This explanation offers us several insights.  The Army respondents were
not asked whether they had been sexually harassed.  Rather, they were asked
whether they had endured certain experiences which the researchers then
matched against certain criteria and defined as harassing.  The criteria for har-
assing experiences were derived from a national survey of predominantly white
college women, although the female respondents in the Army survey were
“more likely [than the men surveyed] to be lower ranking [and] black,” and not
attending college as full time students.97  Both the Army researchers and the de-
velopers of the SEQ made the questionable assumption that behavior can be de-
termined to be sexually harassing without reference to the recipient’s cultural
background or to the context in which it occurred.98  If one were to envisage an
array of sexually harassing behavior arranged by the degree of violence, with
rape or murder at one end of the spectrum and sexually oriented scrutiny or
language at the other, the recipient’s cultural background, or the context in
94. Id. at 235.
95. See DoD Directive, supra note 29, ¶ E2.1.15, E21.15.3.
96. Rosen & Martin, supra note 40, at 226 (footnotes omitted).
97. Id. at 228. Eighty-four percent of Army women are in the enlisted ranks.  Of those women
only 41 percent are white, 48 percent are black and 11 percent are of other races.  See Laura L. Miller,
Feminism and the Exclusion of Army Women from Combat, 16 GENDER ISSUES 33, 54-55 (1998).  The so-
cial scientists administering the surveys assumed that an instrument designed to test responses of
predominately white college students would adequately reflect the responses of high school gradu-
ates who were predominately non-white. See Cynthia R. Mabry, African Americans ‘Are Not Carbon
Copies’ of White Americans - The Role of African American Culture in Mediation of Family Disputes, 13
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 405 (1998) (discussing the possible consequences resulting from the cul-
tural difference between whites and blacks).
98. The authors seem to acknowledge that their “objective” (consensus of female college stu-
dents) criteria, derived from the SEQ, must be supplemented by the recipient’s subjective evaluation
of the behavior, much as the DoD Directive utilizes Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., supra note 43 and
accompanying text.  “The concept of perceived harassment is also important, since this provides an
indication of how the work environment is subjectively evaluated.” Rosen & Martin, supra note 40,
at 226.  For a discussion of their approach to perceived harassment, see my Conclusion.
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which the incident occurred, would have no legal relevance at the violent end of
the spectrum.  This same assumption, however, that cultural background and
context have no relevance, does not apply at the non-violent end of the spec-
trum.  Further, a later SEQ survey of a far larger sample of Army personnel99 es-
tablished that female respondents typically endure sexual harassment at the
non-violent end of the spectrum.100  Thus, it is not surprising that the researchers
concluded that, of the three subscales used by the SEQ:
The scale that most closely approximates the concept of a hostile work envi-
ronment is gender harassment, which includes the display of pornographic or
suggestive materials, crude, sexist or offensive remarks and sexist or discrimi-
natory behavior.101
99. Compare 2 SENIOR REVIEW REPORT, supra note 40, at 16 (noting that Army wide survey
yielded 14,498 useable subjects) with Rosen & Martin, supra note 40, at 225 (finding that a prior sur-
vey yielded 1,316 subjects).
100. 2 SENIOR REVIEW REPORT, supra note 40, at 35-40:
During the past twelve months in this company, have you ever been in a situation where
fellow soldiers or supervisors:
. . .
115. Made unwanted attempts to stroke or fondle you (e.g. stroking your leg or neck)?
NEVER: 84.5%; ONCE OR TWICE: 8.8%; SOMETIMES: 4%; OFTEN: 2.1%; ALWAYS: .7%
. . . .
116. Made unwanted attempts to have sex with you that resulted in you pleading, crying,
or physically struggling?
NEVER: 93.4%; ONCE OR TWICE: 2.9%; SOMETIMES: 2.2%; OFTEN: 1.0%; ALWAYS:
.5%
. . .
124. Had sex with you without your consent or against your will?
NEVER: 96.0%; ONCE OR TWICE: 1.6%; SOMETIMES: 1.3%; OFTEN: .7%; ALWAYS:
.5%.
These responses have implications for Professor Morris’ conclusions in By Force of Arms: Rape, War
and Military Culture, supra note 13.
101. Rosen & Martin, supra note 40, at 226.  The rejected subscales involved unwanted sexual
attention and coercion or imposition.  We have seen a low incidence in the larger survey of affirma-
tive responses to questions involving assault and battery.  See supra note 92.  The same levels were
reported for coercion:
“During the past twelve months in this company, have you ever been in a situation where
fellow soldiers or supervisors:
. . .
117.  Made you feel you were subtly bribed with some sort of reward or special treatment
to engage in sexual behavior?
NEVER: 89.6%; ONCE OR TWICE: 5.1%; SOMETIMES: 2.9%; OFTEN: 2.0%;
ALWAYS: .5%
118. Made you feel you were subtly threatened with some sort of retaliation for not being
sexually cooperative (e.g. the mention of an upcoming evaluation review, etc.)?
NEVER: 90.8%; ONCE OR TWICE: 4.0%; SOMETIMES: 3.1%; OFTEN: 1.4%;
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The researchers, relying on the same definition of sexual harassment found
in the DoD Directive102 asked respondents whether they believed that sexual
harassment was a problem in their units.  “Four response choices were provided
ranging from ‘not a problem’ to ‘a severe problem.’  In multiple regression
analysis, which included the three SEQ subscales as independent variables, gen-
der harassment was the strongest predictor of sexual harassment.”103
Thus, the social science researchers defined a constellation of behaviors of-
fensive to predominately white college women as gender harassment, applied
them in an ill-defined “workplace” setting to predominately non-white high
school graduates, and determined that a hostile work environment existed.104
This analysis is unsatisfactory support for the researchers’ conclusions.
Finally, the most recent and comprehensive survey of sexual harassment in
the Army was undertaken in the winter of 1996-97 as a consequence of the Ab-
erdeen training incidents.  A Senior Review Panel sampled the perceptions of
Army leaders, soldiers, and civilians through the use of surveys based on the
Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (SEQ), focus group discussions, interviews
and observations.105  Its findings illustrate the definitional problems implicit in
using civilian/legal terms in a military/social science context:
The data indicate that 80% of the sample reported experiencing at least one of
the SEQ behaviors . . . More women than men reported experiencing SEQ be-
haviors.  Crude/Offensive behaviors such as hearing suggestive stories, offen-
sive jokes or sexual remarks were the most frequently experienced behaviors by
men and women . . . However only 9% of the sample reported they had been
sexually harassed.  This suggests that individuals’ definitions of sexual harass-
ment may not include these behaviors.106
In evaluating trainees’ reports of SEQ behaviors, the Report concluded:
“[T]here was a discrepancy in the percent reporting a SEQ behavior and the per-
cent reporting sexual harassment.  This was likely due to trainees using their own
definition of what constitutes sexual harassment rather than the Army’s defini-
tion when determining whether or not they had been sexually harassed.”107  In
fact, as discussed earlier, the DoD definition of workplace harassment is ex-
ALWAYS: .6%.
2 SENIOR REVIEW REPORT, supra note 40, at A-35-38.
102. See supra text accompanying note 31.  The researchers designated as the definition’s source
a General Accounting Office report on sexual harassment at the Service Academies. See Rosen &
Martin, supra note 40, at 241 n.27.  Perhaps they were unaware of the DoD Directive.
103. Rosen & Martin, supra note 40, at 226-27.
104. See id at 235. I must emphasize that my criticism of the survey’s use of the SEQ is not di-
rected at its conclusion that respondents in those units which reported the highest incidence of of-
fensive behaviors perceived those units to have a sexual harassment problem and that these units
were also perceived by the respondents to be the least combat ready.  That conclusion is unaffected
by my criticism which is directed to the survey’s unknowing misuse of legal terms devised to de-
termine compliance with Title VII.
105. See 2 SENIOR REVIEW REPORT, supra note 40, at 13.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
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tremely broad and fails to require either pervasiveness or extreme behavior.108
Similarly, the SEQ survey used by the Army counts one incident as workplace
harassment.  In contrast, General Kennedy was quoted as believing that a single
incident of unwanted sexual attention (“making a pass”) does not constitute
sexual harassment.109  Thus, there is confusion between the standards espoused
by the military,110 used in the SEQ survey and stated by General Kennedy.  It is
therefore not surprising that a military lawyer is quoted as saying: “Parts of the
policy are unclear.  For example ‘unwelcome behavior’ - how do you know until
you try?”111
The three surveys analyzed in this section confirmed that there was sexual
harassment in the military.  However, the criteria used in the surveys to identify
incidents of sexual harassment did not match the criteria established by the DoD
Directive.  Also, as we have seen, the criteria established by the DoD Directive
does not match the criteria articulated for sexual harassment in the civilian
community.112  Despite this, the surveys may be useful to the military’s goal of
eliminating any form of gender based behavior which would detract from the
Department’s policy to “[p]romote an environment free from personal, social, or
institutional barriers that prevent Service members from rising to the highest
level of responsibility possible.”113  The surveys are useless and palpably mis-
leading, however, if one seeks to determine the incidence of the severity of
workplace harassment (as that term is legally defined) in the military or to com-
pare the civilian and military experiences.  The concluding section discusses the
possible motivation for the dual discrepancy between the criteria used in the
surveys, those used in the Directive and those used in Title VII jurisprudence.
VI. CONCLUSION
If one accepts the premise that the legal meaning of the term “sexual har-
assment” is derived from the language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the implementing guidance of the Equal Opportunity Commission, and the
interpretation of those provisions by the federal courts, then it follows that the
Department of Defense has misused the term in three contexts by failing to make
the appropriate distinctions.  In the first, DoD surveys have not distinguished
between incidents which are so serious that the law treats one event as harass-
ment and those relatively trivial incidents which require a pattern of behavior.
This distinction is important because Title VII criteria for workplace harassment
108. See supra text accompanying note 86.
109. See McElwaine, supra note 2, at 5.
110. 2 SENIOR REVIEW REPORT, supra note 40, at A-8, B-7, C-7, E-7 (1997). The Survey treated a
single reported incident as sexual harassment.  “The Military Focus Group Protocol consisted of 17
questions; one question asked for a definition of sexual harassment in order to determine soldiers’
understanding of the Army definition. This question was not analyzed.” Id. at 54.
111. Id. at 98.
112. See text accompanying notes 78-90 (discussing the criteria used in the DoD survey); text ac-
companying notes 95-97 (discussing the Rosen & Martin Army Survey which focused on sexist be-
havior reported by female college students); text accompanying note 108 (noting the use of the same
criteria as in the Rosen & Martin Survey).
113. DoD Directive, supra note 29, ¶ 4.2.
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at the non-violent end of the behavioral spectrum requires workplace behavior
which is severe pervasive.114  The surveys also failed to specify the location and
timing of when the harassing behavior occurred.115  This distinction is important
because Title VII imposes employer liability only when the “totality of the cir-
cumstances lead to the inference that the employer failed to take steps to prevent
the harassing behavior.”116  Finally, the surveys assume that harassment is de-
termined solely by the beholder, rather than imposing both a subjective and ob-
jective standard as is required in the civilian context.
While ostensibly using language derived from the Act, the EEOC guide-
lines, and court decisions, the DoD Directive fails to acknowledge that the civil-
ian definition has different purposes - to establish civil liability of the employer
in a jury trial by setting criteria for fact finders.  The Directive fails to acknowl-
edge that the remedies - money damages and the doctrine of constructive dis-
charge - available to civilian claimants are not available to military women.
Moreover, the Directive’s statement that harassing behavior may be “contrary to
good order and discipline” implicitly recognizes that the penalties imposed on
military harassers differ in kind from those that can be levied against civilians.
This article naturally leads to the following questions: “What did the Depart-
ment of Defense and its researchers have in mind when they made what logi-
cians would call a category error?”117 and “What are the practical consequences,
if any, of the error?”  To answer these questions, one must distinguish between
the social science researchers who designed and carried out the surveys and the
policy makers who drafted and implemented the Directive.
The evidence adduced suggests that the researchers simply didn’t recog-
nize that the phrases “sexual harassment” and “hostile work environment” have
become legal terms of art.118  Additionally, the researchers were unfamiliar with
the DoD Directive and the law on which it is based.119  When researchers asked
about sexual harassment, they seemed to actually mean gender based words or
acts which made the recipient or an observer uncomfortable.120  Thus, because
the surveys did not address legal harassment, the question of the extent of har-
assment within the military is left unanswered.  This does not mean the surveys
114. See OMILIAN & KAMP, supra note 11; see also supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
115. See supra text accompanying note 97-99.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
117. Legal arguments are based on categorical syllogisms.  If an object is placed in the wrong
class, that is a category error, and the conclusion drawn from the syllogism may be false.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 85-90 (discussing the DoD Directive), notes 107-08
(discussing the SEQ survey).  However, one recent survey of the literature of gender differences in
perceptions of sexual harassment acknowledges the distinction between social science and legal ap-
proaches.  “[S]tudies of sexual harassment perceptions need not answer the question of whether a
plaintiff’s circumstances satisfy the legal criteria for harassment.  Indeed, they are not expressly de-
signed to do so.  Rather, an important use of such studies is to identify potential differences in the
ways subjects, and analogously jurors, might perceive and assess evidence. . . . “  Jeremy A. Blumen-
thal, The Reasonable Woman Standard: A Meta-Analytic Review of Gender Differences in Perceptions of
Sexual Harassment, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 33, 48 (1998).  Of course, in a military context, there is no
threat of civil liability imposed by jurors.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 41-52.
120. See supra note 90.
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are not useful.  The research established that there is evidence of gender bias in
units of the armed forces,121 and that perceptions of that bias correlate with
negative opinions of unit cohesion and efficiency.122  These surveys should cause
commanders and policy makers interested in improving cohesion and efficiency
to take steps to minimize the behavior which gives rise to such perceptions.123
The social scientists’ error may have been due to their unawareness of the
fact that “sexual harassment in the workplace” has become a legal term, care-
fully crafted by government agencies and glossed by the judicial system.  They
used a legal term, but failed to properly employ the same criteria that underlies
its definition.  While we may conclude that the social scientists didn’t intend to
confuse, what of the DoD lawyers and the policymakers who sought to trans-
plant Title VII language into an environment for which it had not been intended?
There are two traditional approaches to the understanding of an intellectual
work:124 we can examine the text, relying on its plain meaning or we can examine
its context which will determine its meaning.  A textual approach to the Direc-
tive doesn’t explain its meaning - the words “workplace,” “harassment,” and
“hostile environment” have been detached from their familiar EEOC moorings
and have no legal consequences.125  Likewise, a contextual approach is unhelpful.
“The spirit of the age” demanded that the Department of Defense issue policy
guidance which conformed with American ideals of fair treatment for women,
but why was the guidance so confusing?  As says J.L. Austin, the linguistic phi-
losopher, in order to understand a speaker (or writer)’s meaning, one must
grasp what he intended.126  Austin calls this the illocutionary force of the utter-
ance.127
There is no legislative history of the DoD Directive, but I suggest that its
drafters were driven by two conflicting needs.  On the one hand, they may well
have wanted to reassure their external constituencies: Congress, the press, and
the segment of the public concerned with the equal treatment of women.  What
better way to do this than to use familiar legal terms drawn from civilian life to
claim that the doctrines they represented would be applied to members of the
armed forces?  Neither Congress, the press, nor most feminist groups realized
that the familiar terms had lost their meaning when applied within the mili-
121. See 1 SENIOR REVIEW REPORT, supra note 1; Rosen & Martin, supra note 40, at 233 tbl. 4.
122. See supra text accompanying note 93.
123. One would assume that these researchers, including those who devised the SEQ, would
acknowledge that it would be unrealistic to expect the bias or harassment to be at the “low end” of
the spectrum.  Such behavior can be discouraged through the use of non-punitive measures.  In ci-
vilian life, this type of harassment is considered to be among the ordinary trials and tribulations of
the modern workplace. See infra note 121.  Thus service declarations of “zero tolerance” for sexual
harassment must be understood to be purely hortatory. John Pulley, Gender-Issues Study Spurs Some
Changes, AIR FORCE TIMES, Apr. 27, 1998, at 9.
124. My approach is based on Quentin Skinner’s seminal article, Meaning and Understanding in
the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. & THEORY 3 (1969), which applies linguistic philosophy to historical con-
cepts.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50 (discussing the concepts of “workplace,”
“harassment,” and “hostile environment”).
126. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 99 passim (1962).
127. See id.
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tary.128  This is “The Jackalope” dimension of the Directive.  The Jackalope is an
artificial creature, routinely found in Western taverns and souvenir shops, con-
structed by a taxidermist’s addition of antelope’s horns to the head of a large
jackrabbit.1298  The creators’ goals are benign: to stimulate conversation and to
amuse.  Certainly, the illocutionary force of the Directive is similarly benign.
The Directive, however, also serves as a Chimera, a creature from Greek my-
thology, combining (as the Jackalope does) the members of different animals,
but “possessing immense strength and ferocity which they employed for the in-
jury and annoyance of men.”130  Presumably, the drafters also wanted to affect
the behavior of their internal constituencies - the armed services and their civil-
ian and military members - not only to reassure military women that they would
be protected by the same doctrines as civilian women (although that is not the
case), but to remind military harassers and their superiors that criminal charges
could be brought for conduct “contrary to good order and discipline.”131  Thus, is
this artificial military creature, created from civilian parts, which simultaneously
should reassure one part of the constituency while threatening another, an effec-
tive tool for combating sexual harassment?
I believe that the Department of Defense’s external constituency is satisfied
that the military is taking appropriate steps to respond to harassing behavior.
Internally, the response is less positive.  Recently, two female former officers -
one from the Navy132 and one from the Air Force133 - wrote separate articles as-
serting that the incidence and severity of harassing behavior has increased dis-
proportionately.  Both relied on anecdotal evidence because, as we have seen,
there are no reliable statistics.134  Obviously, opinions may vary depending on the
individual, the unit, the armed service, the sex of those surveyed and the extent
of recent media exposure.  Nonetheless, a 1997 survey undertaken at 8th Air
Force Headquarters, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana after First Lieutenant
Crista Davis accepted non-judicial punishment for conduct unbecoming an offi-
cer concluded:135
128. A few individuals realized that these terms had lost their meaning.  See supra note 13; Shir-
ley Sagawa & Nancy Duff Campbell, Sexual Harassment of Women in the Military, WOMEN IN THE MIL.
ISSUE PAPER, Oct. 30, 1992.
129. See Jackalope fans, take note: (visited Jan. 30, 1999) <http://www.lafayette.edu/~hollidac/
jackalope.html>.
130. THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH’S MYTHOLOGY 101 (1934).
131. Thus, three Army officers (a second lieutenant, a captain and a major at Ft. Bliss Texas)
were dismissed and imprisoned for periods up to twenty months for sexual relations with female
enlisted soldiers.  Army Sexual Misconduct, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1997, at A2.  Civilian harassers
could not be jailed for similar behavior with adult subordinates.  See id.  Idaho recently criminalized
sexual encounters between doctors and patients.  See Laura Vander Kay,  Doctors’ Penalties in Sex
Offenses Not Harsh, Study Says, WASH. TIMES, June 17, 1998, at A-10.
132. See Kristin K. Heimark, Sexual Harassment in the United States Navy: A New Pair of Glasses, 44
NAVAL L. REV. 223 (1997).
133. See Diane H. Mazur, The Beginning of the End for Women in the Military, 48 FLA. L. REV. 461
(1996).
134. See Karen Jowers, Sexual Harassment Complaints Fall Overseas, AIR FORCE TIMES, Jan. 11,
1999, at 7 (discussing a July 1998 survey which reported a dramatic decrease in harassment com-
plaints).
135. The punishment was for writing letters to her lover’s wife boasting about the relationship
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While the sample of female officers interviewed was not large, an unusually
high number stated they believed that some form of discrimination took place at
8th Air Force headquarters.  None could give specific examples but were relying
on “feelings, intuition, and judgment.”136
Just as military women sense gender bias, so do their male coworkers fear
allegations of gender based discrimination which, in a highly competitive envi-
ronment, can destroy a career even if the alleged harasser is exonerated.137  Sym-
bolic of this fear is the fact that conferees at the July 26th, 1998 Defense Depart-
ment third biennial conference on equal opportunity debated whether the MEO
program should be abolished and simply become another aspect of command
responsibility.138  While this article does not offer such a radical solution, the
analysis indicates that DoD’s pretense that their sexual harassment policies
mimic those found in the rest of the federal government obscures rather than
clarifies the peculiar problems facing military women.  These problems include:
heightened deployment and the stresses imposed on military families,139 many of
whom are “joint service,”140 and an increase in the number of young married
couples which has led to a greater number of incidents of family violence and
sexual abuse.141  Also, the increase in the number of women in uniform, from less
than 6% in 1977 to nearly 14% in 1997142 has highlighted gender biases in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.143  These are the issues policymakers should be
which had begun when he was her English teacher at the Air Force Academy.  See Study at Base
Finds Widespread Perception of Sexism, AIR FORCE TIMES, Sept. 1, 1997, at 6.
136. Id.  Three months later Col. Wanda Wood of the Air Force reported that the data from two
surveys “show that we have a good healthy human relations climate” compared with what the Air
Force Times called “the institutional harassment and discrimination found in the Army.”  John Pul-
ley, Airmen Note Relatively Few Gender Woes, AIR FORCE TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at 8.  The Air Force’s
surveys were based on the same methodology utilized by the Army’s Senior Review Panel.  John
Pulley, Report Prompts Air Force to Analyze Sexual Harassment. AIR FORCE TIMES, Oct. 6, 1997, at 6.
137. See Andrew Compart, Fears About False Accusations Grow, AIR FORCE TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at
10.  Whether or not the accusations are false, a marred record can bar promotion, prevent an in-
crease in salary, and cost thousands of dollars in lost retirement pay.  Two female officers com-
plained that Captain Everett Green, U.S.N., nominated for admiral, had “sexually harassed them
with persistent and overly familiar, but never sexual or crude, cards and notes.”  Green was acquit-
ted by a court-martial but removed from the promotion list, as was Captain Mark A. Rogers, U.S.N.,
who the Navy concluded had engaged in sexual harassment by “[r]epeatedly using coarse language
in front of fellow White House Military Office workers.” Ernest Blazar, Inside the Ring, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 1998, at A11.
138. See Lisa Daniel, Equal Opportunity Review, AIR FORCE TIMES, Aug. 17, 1998, at 18.
139. The percentage of married enlisted personnel by service: Air Force, 65.2%; Army 56%; Navy
55.5%; Marine Corps, 43.6%.  In 1997, 15.9 % of the enlisted people entering the Army were married;
in the Air Force it was 10 percent, the Navy 5.2 percent and the Marine Corps 4.2 percent. See Fast
Facts, AIR FORCE TIMES, July 13, 1998, at 14.  In 1998, 11.4% of military women were single parents,
compared with 4.7% of military men.  See Karen Jowers, Single-parent Families on the Rise in the Mili-
tary, AIR FORCE TIMES, Jan. 18, 1999, 16.
140. Half of all enlisted women and more than a third of all female officers have husbands who
are also in the armed forces.  See Ernest Blazar, Inside the Ring, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1997, at A10.
141. See David E. Rovella, Jags Change With Military, NAT’L L.J., June 22, 1998, at A1.
142. See More Women, AIR FORCE TIMES, July 13, 1998, at 13.
143. See Lt. Cdr. Peter A. Detton, U.S.N., Spousal Battery as Aggravated Assault: A Proposal to Mod-
ify the UCMJ, 43 NAVAL L. REV. 111 (1996); Michael F. Noone & Mary Jo Wiley, Sticks, Stones and
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concerned with.
Department of Defense policymakers sought to ensure equal treatment of
military women.  Unfortunately, their policy relied on language designed to im-
pose civil liability on the employers of civilian women.  The misconceived lan-
guage in their Directive reassures the uninformed, but confuses both the women
whom it was intended to protect and those responsible for their protection.  So-
cial scientists, who were called on to study the incidence of sexual harassment in
the military, failed to use measurements which would enable policymakers to
determine whether the military has met or surpassed the civilian community’s
goals.  There have been no criteria developed to measure the treatment of mili-
tary women.  Once articulated, these criteria, would for reasons of morale and
unit cohesion more closely approach the general civility code, denigrated by the
Supreme Court, but sought by Professor Rorty.  Meanwhile, anyone who speaks
of sexual harassment in the military workplace should be asked to define those
terms.
Broken Bones: Military Law’s Criteria for Aggravated Assault, 14 FEMINIST ISSUES 67 (1994).
